Two central puzzles about social norms are how they are enforced and how they are created or modified. The sanctions for the violation of a norm can be categorized as automatic, guilt, shame, informational, bilateral-costly, and multilateral- 
neglect by economists. 2 We focus instead on how norms operate and so on the variety of sanctions that enforce norms, the degree of underenforcement associated with each type of sanction, and the difficulty of creating norms enforced by each type of sanction.
The sanctions are various:
1. Automatic sanctions. The violator's action carries its own penalty because of its not being coordinated with the actions of others. Someone who drives on the wrong side of the road crashes into another car.
Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action," 63 University of Chicago Law Review 133, 155-161 (1996) ; Eric A. Posner, "Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms," 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1697 (1996 ; J. Mark Ramseyer, "Learning to Love Japan: Social Norms and Market Incentives," 34 San Diego Law Review 263 (1994) ;"Symposium, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic Analysis of Law," 27 Journal of Legal Studies (1998) .
2 This is an old story: Thomas Macaulay and James Fitzjames Stephen attacked James and John Stuart Mill, respectively, for overemphasizing laws relative to norms as explanations for differences in culture and behavior. Thomas Macaulay, "Mill on Government," Edinburgh Review (March 1829) and "Westminster Reviewer's Defense of Mill," Edinburgh Review (June 1829); James Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity , chapters 1 and 4 (1874). John Stuart Mill, however does emphasize the tyranny of public opinion, thus tacitly recognizing the importance of informal norms in shaping behavior. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859).
2. Guilt. The violator feels bad about his violation as a result of his education and upbringing, quite apart from external consequences.
Probably most people in our society, though certainly not all, would feel at least somewhat guilty about stealing even if they believed they were certain not to be caught.
3. Shame. The violator feels that his action has lowered himself either in his own eyes or in the eyes of other people. In its most common form, shame arises when other people find out about the violation and think badly of the violator. The violator may also feel ashamed, however, even if others do not discover the violation. He can imagine what they would think if they did discover it, a moral sentiment which can operate even if he knows they never will discover it. Also, he may feel lowered in his own eyes, a "multiple self" situation in which the individual is both the actor and the observer of his actions. 3 Because the focus is on the violator's status rather than on the violation, there can be shame even if there is no element of wrongdoing, no breach of a moral code; so one can be ashamed of doing something stupid that harms nobody, because behaving stupidly 3 On multiple-self analysis, see, for example, Richard A. Posner, "Are We One Self or Multiple Selves? Implications for Law and Public Policy" 3 Legal Theory 23 (1997) .
is failing to live up to one's self-image. This type of shame shades off into simple embarrassment.
One can also be shamed (though the better word here would be "humiliated") for conduct that violates a moral code not one's own and so there is no question of guilt. During the Cultural Revolution in China, people paraded through the streets in dunce caps felt humiliated even if they disapproved of the regime and therefore felt no guilt at violating its norms.
For simplicity, we shall treat humiliation as a form of shame, and shame itself as (1) a purely external sanction for (2) violations of the moral code. It is important to note, however, that even when viewed purely as an external sanction, that is, as the product of the actions or reactions of other people, shame (like guilt) is felt even if other people take no action. If a professor's arrest for patronizing a prostitute is publicized, he feels ashamed before his colleagues even though none of them mentions the arrest to him, perhaps because none of them mentions it-their silence, which is a reaction to the shameful act, is evidence that the act was indeed shameful and cannot just be laughed off.
Neither guilt nor shame fits comfortably into the implicit psychological assumptions of the rational-choice model of human behavior. We treat them as brute facts, like food preferences, which constrain rather than explain economic theories of behavior.
4. Informational sanctions. The violator's action conveys information about himself that he would rather others not know. A student wears casual clothing to a job interview, unintentionally signaling that he doesn't really care about getting the job.
Bilateral costly sanctions.
The violator is punished by the actions of and at the expense of just one other person, whose identity is specified by the norm. The expense to that person could be the effort needed to cause the violator disutility, or the utility that the person imposing the punishment loses by punishing him. Examples of what we are calling bilateral costly sanctions are where an adulterer is shot by a jealous husband and where the husband divorces his wife after discovering her adultery.
6. Multilateral costly sanctions. The violator is punished by the actions and at the expense of many other people. A divorced man finds that he is no longer invited to dinner in the community. 4 4 Our categories of guilt and shame correspond to "first party" sanctions in Ellickson's terminology; our bilateral costly to his "second party"; and our multilateral costly to his "third party." Ellickson, note 1 above, at 130-131. He does not include what we are calling the automatic and the informational sanctions in his taxonomy because they are not methods of enforcing norms as he defines "norm." For other discussion of definitional issues (which we'll largely A norm can be enforced by more than one sanction-indeed, by all six. A drunk driver weaves along the road and crashes into a bus, killing a child. He has wrecked his car, he feels guilty, he knows that all his neighbors look down on him, his employer discovers that he is an alcoholic, the child's parents condemn him, and he is ostracized by the entire community.
All six sanctions have analogies in rewards for adherence to norms or for actions beyond the call of duty. A reward can take the form of a feeling of a duty well done, material gratitude from one or more people, the automatic gain from coordinated interaction with someone else, the signaling of desirable qualities, or the good opinion of others.
We shall consider the sanctions one by one, but it may be useful at the outset to mention some general properties of optimal nonlegal sanctions. A sanction should be of the appropriate magnitude; if it is too severe, people will be overdeterred and refrain from efficient actions. A sanction should not be too costly; the cost will depend largely on how often it has to be administered, that is, on the frequency of violation of the norm. Because of the informality of enforcement, it is important that the application of a sanction not duck), see Richard McAdams, "The Origin, Development, and require too much information. If punishment will not be effective unless many people learn about the violation, there may be no punishment at all.
II. SANCTIONS FOR VIOLATING NORMS
Automatic sanctions. The classic example of an automatically enforced, or self-enforcing, norm is the convention of driving on the right side of the road. By violating the norm one increases the chances of an accident to oneself as well as to other people. Norms often are self-enforcing in the sense that the violator is punished automatically without the deliberate intervention of anyone. But the punishment may not be adequate-even in the case of driving on the right-because the violator considers the cost only to himself and not to other people.
Drunk drivers sometimes drive on the wrong side of the road, even though they know they may hurt themselves, in part because they neglect the cost to other people. Coordination norms may also be suboptimal rules that are difficult to change, such as the way "though" is spelled in English. This, however, is a problem in altering rather than enforcing norms, so we defer it for now.
Regulation of Norms," 96 Michigan Law Review 338 (1997) .
Guilt. Guilt is an internal sanction, and so does not depend on the dissemination of information. It might be thought a type of automatic sanction, since the violator perceives it as a cost to himself, like the risk of being injured if he drives on the wrong side of the road. It differs from a simple automatic sanction, however, in requiring investment to create it. People must choose a level of effort to instill the potential for feeling guilt into other people (sometimes even themselves), as well as the amount of guilt to instill. This illustrates our earlier point that economics can "use" the concept of guilt even if it cannot explain it.
The sense of guilt may be innate, but it is also developed by formal schooling, purposive moral in uence by par ents and relatives, and, possibly most important, the examples offered by both adults and peers. Parents have an interest, both selfish and altruistic, in instilling a certain amount of guilt in their children. (So they may instill too much guilt, from the standpoint of the child's long-run self-interest, for offenses such as rudeness, or ingratitude, to one's elders.) A child who has a sense of guilt is more likely to conform to norms, and other people's knowledge of this will help him later in life by making him a more reliable transacting partner. Rational parents will choose, and employ the level of effort required to achieve, the degree of strength of the guilt sanction that will allow for efficient breach of the norm, since often it is advantageous to violate a norm, especially if others are adhering to it. Rational parents will also endeavor to maintain marginal deterrence and so refrain from trying to make a child feel as guilty about not brushing his teeth as about shoplifting.
That a sense of guilt should be to the child's long-run advantage illustrates one of the central insights of game theory-that reducing the potential payoffs that a player obtains in certain contingencies can increase his equilibrium payoff by inducing other people to alter their behavior. This point is illustrated in Figure 1 , which models the parental decision as to whether to instill guilt about wrongdoing in their daughter. When the daughter grows up, an employer will decide whether or not to hire her, and if she is hired she will decide whether or not to steal from the employer. Assume that the dollar value of the job to the daughter is 40, the benefit to the employer from the daughter's work is 50, the dollar value of both the gain to the daughter and the loss to the employer from theft is 30, and the theft cannot be detected. The daughter's net pecuniary gain from being and so the employer would hire her because her payoff from honest working, 40, would exceed her gain from dishonest working and the employer would derive a net benefit from hiring of 10 (50-40).
The daughter thus benefits from her parents' creation of guilt feelings (conscience) in her, assuming that the job with this employer is her best job opportunity. She obtains the job by having the potential to feel guilty, but she does not suffer any actual pangs of guilt because she's honest. By having reduced the payoff to their daughter from stealing on the job, the parents have benefited her because of the reaction of the third party, the employer, to their action. 
Notes:
1.Numbers indicate payoffs to parents-daughter (the parents and daughter are assumed to have the same payoff) and to employer, respectively.
Arrows denote equilibrium actions if G>30.
Shame. When viewed as a purely external sanction, shame requires information but is not an informational sanction (our fourth category), because it can arise even if the violation does not convey any new information about the character of the violator. Often, however, what we call shame is partly an informational sanction: the man caught drunk driving is revealing that he probably drinks heavily on a regular basis, and it is his consciousness of people's reaction to the revelation that engenders the feeling of shame in him. This can be true even of purely internal shame; someone titillated by his first sight of sexually deviant pornography may be ashamed to discover inclinations within himself that he never suspected he had.
Shame is often a byproduct of bilateral or multilateral sanctions.
When people criticize a norm violator they are trying to impose a multilateral sanction, but the disutility of the criticisms to the violator, and thus the efficacy of the sanction, may be due entirely to shame. If the violator shrugs off the criticisms as a product of ignorance, malice, or envy, and in addition anticipates no bad effects on him from the reception of the criticisms by other people, the criticisms will fail as sanctions for the criticized act.
Shame, like guilt, is a product, in part at least, of education, both formal and informal. Parents may have a greater incentive to instill shame in their children than guilt. The optimal strategy from the child's selfish (which may be the parents' altruistic) viewpoint is to violate norms but not get caught, and shame, to the extent that it is an external sanction and thus depends on information, provides the right incentives for that.
Informational sanctions. If the violation of a norm is positively correlated with the possession of undesirable characteristics, people will be likely to punish the violator. 5 The undesirable personal characteristic could be a tendency to violate the particular norm-as when a man beats a woman and is punished by not being able to find any other woman willing to associate with him-or to violate norms generally. The sanction is efficient. Not only does it impose significant costs on the violator; its cost to the enforcer is actually negative, because he averts a loss by avoiding dealings with a person who by his violation has revealed himself to be an unreliable transactional partner.
The personal (or commercial) characteristic revealed by the violation may be only distantly related to the violation yet convey valuable information, as when a person arrested for assault is believed 5 See, for example, Eric A. Posner, "Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law," 27 Journal of Legal Studies 765 (1998); Eric Rasmusen, "Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality," 39 Journal of Law and Economics 519 (1996) . to be less likely to work hard for whoever employs him. Consider the following game:
1. Nature chooses 90 percent of workers to be "steady," with productivity p=x, and 10 percent to be "wild," with productivity p=x-y.
2. A worker decides whether to marry or not. Marriage adds utility u=m for a steady worker and utility u=-z for a wild worker.
3. The employer, observing whether the worker is married but not whether he is wild, offers him a wage w m or w u in competition with other employers, depending on whether he is married or not. The employer has no intrinsic reason to care whether the worker is married or not. Wild workers are less productive, but whether they are married has no effect on their productivity. The only significance of marriage for the employer is its informational value as a signal of steadiness.
4. The payoffs received are p w for the employer if he succeeds in hiring the worker, w u for a married employed worker, w for an unmarried employed worker, u for a married unemployed worker, and 0 for an employer who does not hire and for an unmarried worker who is not hired.
What will the equilibrium be? Unlike many signaling models, 6 here there is only a single equilibrium. If z is large enough (namely, greater than y), the employer will pay wages of w u =x-y and w m =x, the steady worker will get married, and the wild worker will stay single. 7 The employer in this example might be "unthinkingly" obeying a norm of paying married workers more. Businessmen, like private individuals, follow many norms without inquiring into their rationality.
In the example, following the norm is efficient even if no businessman understands its origin or rationale. And notice that unmarried workers will not marry in order to fool the employer into paying them a higher wage, because by definition these are the workers for whom the wage premium is less than the disutility (stemming from their "wildness") of 6 See Eric Rasmusen, Games and Information, ch. 10 (2d ed. 1994) , and next footnote. 7 The analysis is more complicated, however, if z<y. For example, if z <.9y, wild workers will all get married and pretend to be steady. The employer will offer wages of w u =x-y and w m =.9x+.1(x-y), but no one will be paid the wage for the unmarried. If y>z>.9y, wild workers will split in their behavior, in a mixed-strategy equilibrium. The employer will pay wages of w u =x-y and w m =x+y+z; the steady worker will get married; the fraction f=.9(y-z)/z of the wild workers will marry; and the employer will earn zero profits when he hires a married worker-i.e., f solves .9x/(.9+.1f)+.1f
A further complication, but not one that would alter the implications of our analysis, is that efficiency might require that the different types of worker (steady and wild) be sorted into different types of job (for example, management and sales). 10 For example, Andrew Yoder, having been ostracized by church orders, sued four church leaders for conspiracy to deprive him of civil liberties. He won, and upon the defendants' refusing to pay damages one of the church leader's farms was sold by the sheriff. The judgment might well have been reversed on appeal, but the norm against going to court seems to have prevented the hiring of defense counsel and the filing of an appeal. John Yoder, "Caesar and the Meidung," 23 Mennonite Quarterly Review 76 (1949). For a theoretical discussion of costly ostracism in a repeated game, see David Hirshleifer and Eric Rasmusen, "Cooperation in a Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with lating a norm are slight; but it does work then, because the cost of this form of sanction to the sanctioner is low.
III. THE CREATION AND DESTRUCTION OF NORMS
A norm is a public good. Although exceptions can be imagined, ordinarily a norm is nonrivalrous, because its cost does not rise if more people use the norm; and it is nonexcludable, because people who do not contribute to its enforcement cannot be denied its benefits.
The norm is therefore in danger of being underproduced. By the same token, once a norm is established, it is hard to change, because norm innovation is also a public good. Creating a norm requires promulgation of the norm and creation of sanctions for its violation.
Eliminating a norm requires promulgation, too, and also the destruction of the expectations and tastes that support the sanctions for its violation-a process of taste-changing that may be as costly as their creation in the first place. Changing a norm, which requires elements of both destruction and creation, can be the most difficult trick of all.
Consider changing a self-enforcing coordination norm, such as a rule of language. If "goodbye" became an inefficient form of farewell, Ostracism," 12 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 87 individuals could shift to "take care" without cost. Any one person who changed would be able to convey the same meaning as before, and would not be thought worse of by other people. Many writers are now shifting from using "he" as the indefinite pronoun to "he or she," "he/she," or "she." The writer's meaning is still apparent, as in the case of shifting from "goodbye" to "take care," but in the "he/she" case the violation of the grammatical norm distracts the reader and slows down communication. The rapidity with which the norm has nevertheless changed is a result of the felt value to many people of signaling a belief in feminist goals. It has not changed all the way, however, because some writers wish to signal their rejection of what they take to be an extremist feminist ideology.
In both these examples, altering an existing norm is feasible because it can be done gradually and hence without centralized direction. A coordination norm that cannot be changed gradually would be reversing traffic signals so that red meant "go" and green meant "stop," or changing from driving on the right to driving on the left. Such a norm change would have to be adopted by everyone at once, unlike minor language changes, in order to avoid enormous transition costs. The only-but considerable-cost of the norm (1989) . Trying to change from one language to another, as opposed to changing usage within a single language, would present a similar problem on a vaster scale. 12 The cost would be enormous and the benefits highly diffuse even though they might be enormous too.
National languages do change, but ordinarily it is through an intermediate stage of bilingualism. What has been more common is 11 The claim that the QWERTY keyboard is inefficient has, however, been greatly undermined by S. Liebowitz and Stephen Margolis, "The Fable of the Keys," 33 Journal of Law and Economics 1 (1990 Dovetailing the fading and the emerging norm is difficult, however. Rapid change in the social environment may make norms dysfunctional before enough time has passed for the normative system to adapt fully. The overdeveloped sense of honor in white males of the Old South (a residue of a vengeance culture), the similar "macho" values of poor young black males in our cities today, and the surprisingly resilient "coolness" of cigarette smoking are all examples of norms that apparently are dysfunctional under current conditions but that nevertheless persist. Without public intervention, many norms change only gradually or not at all. (This is our earlier point that the destruction as well as the creation of norms is a public good, so that it is possible for the ow of norms to be too small but the stock of norms too large.) This is only a tendency; Cooter gives the counterexample of a relatively rapid change in tribal norms in New Guinea which formerly allowed the "big man" to alienate property, a norm that became dysfunctional once an active land market developed. 17 At the opposite extreme, if frequent change is itself a norm, as in women's fashions, the impression of frequent and easy norm change is misleading. The surprise would be if the "change norm" itself changed suddenly-if one year women's fashions were identical to the previous year's. Where faddism is the norm, the rapid succession of fads indicates norm stability, not instability.
Norms enforced by guilt and shame are particularly difficult to create or to change. (This is a factor in the resistance of honor cultures to norm change: these cultures rely heavily on shame to induce norm compliance.) Guilt and shame are heavily in uenced by social conditioning, which is not quickly or easily altered either by individuals or by governments. Nongovernmental organizations may be more effective than either individuals or governments in this regard, but it is not clear whether a society that gives ample scope to normchanging organizations will have more or less norm creation and 17 Cooter, note 1 above. stability. Religious pluralism, for example, has a complex effect on norms. It facilitates norm shopping, both because a person can find a religion that does not constrain his activities and because he can find one that constrains them in a way that he finds desirable. Belonging to a church that punishes deviance can be as useful to one's long-term welfare (in quite materialistic terms) as having parents who instill guilt. And a religious sect in a pluralist society can provide an alternative community to the society at large, as in the case of the Amish. But while norm competition, which religious freedom promotes, encourages the creation of norms, it also facilitates their destruction.
Understanding how norms change aids in understanding how they are created. When incremental change is feasible, even complex norms can evolve from meager beginnings, given enough time. Comparing the scene depicted on Achilles' shield in Book XX of the Iliad with modern norms of judicial behavior, one gets a glimpse of how those norms could, over a period of more than 2,500 years, have evolved from rudimentary procedures. The shield depicts informal, voluntary arbitration before a lay tribunal. This is remote from modern litigation (though not so remote from modern arbitration), yet it is easy to trace a step by step evolution from the ancient to the modern practices of dispute resolution.
Heavy sanctions for violating a norm affect both norm change and who becomes a norm innovator. Kuran shows how norms that appear to be very strong can suddenly evaporate, enforced as they are by people's beliefs that other people will continue to enforce them. 18 And Tocqueville wrote that revolutionary crowds are led literally by madmen: people who through psychological illness are willing to risk danger and disgrace, or in other who are less responsive to sanctions. 19 Some norms are easier to create than to enforce. It is relatively easy to create coordination norms, since their punishments are automatic, although, as we noted earlier, such punishments are unlikely to be optimally severe, because the violator will ignore the costs of the violation to everyone but himself. On the other hand, a norm that requires multilateral punishment is hard to create in the first place, but once created it may be cheap to enforce (because little is 18 Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification (1995 ). 19 Alexis de Tocqueville, Souvenirs 195 (1978 [1850 ): "I have always thought that in the revolutions and especially in democratic revolutions, madmen, not those to whom one gives the name metaphorically, but real ones, have played a very considerable political required of each punisher) and the problem of cost externalization by the violator will not arise.
The diversity of norms along such dimensions as efficacy, durability, mode of enforcement, and conformity to overall social goals limits the scope of useful generalization. Such questions as whether the United States has too few or too many norms, or whether norms are a good thing or a bad thing, or whether they "work" in a A third point (the first, remember, was supplemental punishment and the second information) is that government should be careful about interfering with norm sanctions. Sometimes just staying out of the way is the best policy. If bilateral sanctions such as shotgun marriages are to work, the law has to relax its monopoly on force. 21 Preventing ordinary citizens from carrying concealed weapons may increase violent crime by hindering the bilateral costly sanction of selfdefense. 22 Fourth, the government can supply incentives for administering private sanctions for violating a norm. Consider the enforcement of contracts that provide for arbitration of disputes arising under them. A contract is a set of norms constructed by two parties. If the law enforces arbitration awards (as it does), it gives legal backing to private norm formation and enforcement.
21 On the importance of this norm, see George Akerlof, Janet Yellen, and Michael Katz, "An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing in the United States," 111 Quarterly Journal of Economics 277 (1996) . They find that the change in the 1960s in the norms governing births out of wedlock was due to the rise of birth control and abortion, which reduced the benefits of shotgun marriages. Most such marriages, of course, were not literally enforced by the threat of violence; nor do we suggest that permitting such threats would be warranted by the costs of out-of-wedlock births, substantial as those costs are. 22 John Lott and David Mustard, "Crime, Deterrence, and the Right to Carry Concealed Handguns," 26 Journal of Legal Studies 1 (1997).
Fifth, the government can foster the creation of norms. In the case of coordination norms, the government can promulgate the new norm, as in the examples we gave earlier. When guilt and shame are the sanctions, the government can help to instill these in children and adults alike. But because moral and intellectual education can work at cross-purposes, an increase in the resources devoted to education is not a dependable means of promoting governance by norms. Intellectual education weakens norms by revealing alternative norms and by providing the tools for the student to use in creating his or her own moral principles. 23 "Liberal" education is "freeing" education and one of those freedoms is from norms. Indeed, if education is more effective at promoting individualistic thinking than at inculcating norms, the net effect of education may be to reduce the normative regulation of society. Whether education is effective at either task is, of course, the despair of teachers at all levels, so it may be that the net effect is small whichever effect preponderates. Nevertheless, what appears to be a long-term movement away from regulation by norms and toward regulation by law may re ect an inverse relation between a society's level of education and the efficacy of regulation by norms. Moreover, 23 As emphasized in Richard A. Posner, "Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach," 87 American Economic Review Papers and education and income are positively correlated; privacy is a superior good; and privacy reduces the efficacy of norms by depriving neighbors, acquaintances, gossips, and scandal sheets of the information needed for shame, informational, and mutilateral sanctions. 24 Sixth, the government has a role to play in combating bad norms.
It can do this by diminishing the benefits of compliance with such norms by creating effective legal remedies for deliberate injuries, which reduces the benefit of a vengeance norm based on (for example) personal honor. Or it can increase the cost of complying with the norm, most simply by affixing a legal penalty such as making dueling a crime. But since the heart of an honor-based vengeance system is a readiness to act without regard to the balance of costs and benefits, increasing the costs of compliance with a bad norm is not so simple as it seems. Once a legal penalty is affixed, compliance with the norm may even more effectively signal the dueler's honor. However, honor implies indifference only to certain costs, in much the same way that indigence may make one indifferent to uncollectable fines, but not to Proceedings 365 (May 1997); see also Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory 70-75 (1999 imprisonment. The proper "currency" in which to punish dueling is to make duelling dishonorable, as by disqualifying the dueller from the public offices that a man of honor is duty-bound to fill. 25 Dueling is too "safe" an example, however, of a bad norm, since no one in our society approves of dueling. One danger of governmental intervention to promote "good" norms and crush "bad" ones is that norms are frequently contested, so that government may find itself taking sides in an unedifying struggle between interest groups. The Constitution provides a partial barrier to such intervention through its guaranties of freedom of religious, speech, and association.
Whether government has the capacity to carry out the functions sketched above may be questioned, in light of the fine tuning required.
Most often it may be best for the government to "keep out of the way" and allow the private regime of norm creation and enforcement to operate unhindered. But obviously the government cannot be kept out of the norm business by any feasible constitutional rule; and we emphasize that intervention which takes the form of supplementing and regulating rather than supplanting norm sanctions is likely to be less intrusive than many other forms of government regulation. Norms
